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Abstract
This Article argues that the approach to treaties taken early in the history of the Republic is
more consistent with the intended meaning of the Supremacy Clause than the approach reflected
in recent judicial practice.
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INTRODUCTION
The Framers of the Federal Constitution inserted a mention
of treaties into the Constitution's Article VI, Clause 2, which has
come to be called the Supremacy Clause (the "Clause"). The
clause proclaims the supremacy of federal statutes, treaties, and
the Constitution itself over the laws of the constituent states.1
The Framers wrote treaties into the Supremacy Clause in order
to ensure that state courts would not interfere with the obliga-
tions the federation had already assumed, and would in the fu-
ture assume, towards other nations of the world.2 Arguing in
favor of including a reference to treaties in Article VI, Clause 2,
as the Constitution was being approved in Virginia, James
Madison said that if state laws were supreme over a treaty, this
"would bring on the Union the just charge of national perfidy."3
As of the late eighteenth century, the range of obligations
States assumed by treaty was modest. In the nineteenth century,
treaties came to be used more frequently. As communication
and transportation increased internationally, so too did the need
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1. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitu-
tion or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
2. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-63 (1940) ("[T]he supremacy of the
national power in the general field of foreign affairs ... is made clear by the Constitu-
tion, was pointed out by the authors of The Federalist in 1787, and has since been given
continuous recognition by this Court.").
3. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADEL-
PHIA IN 1787 515 (Jonathan Elliot ed.,J. B. Lippincott & Co. 2d ed. 1881) (1836).
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to regulate relations between nations. States concluded agree-
ments with one another to regulate commercial relations and
the rendition of criminal suspects.4
Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, treaties of a multi-
lateral type entered the scene as part of a concerted effort to
codify international law,5 which to that point had taken princi-
pally the form of customary law. The United Nations ("U.N.")
General Assembly set up a commission to draft treaties for this
purpose.6 Since then, numerous multilateral treaties have been
concluded under U.N. auspices, resulting in a substantial dis-
placement of customary law by treaty law. For example, the law
relating to the use of maritime space, which had developed over
centuries as customary law, was codified in treaty form.' In the
third quarter of the twentieth century, human rights entered the
international scene as a topic of regulation, and treaties were the
mechanism whereby States agreed to observe rights.'
All this treaty activity opened the possibility that the
Supremacy Clause might involve U.S. courts in a broad range of
issues. In particular, if the many rights and obligations the
United States has assumed by human rights treaties were to fall
under the Supremacy Clause as binding on judges, then a whole
new body of federally-generated norms would bind both the fed-
eral government and the states.
Expansion has, however, been modest. As will be explained
4. See Douglas J. Sylvester, International Law as Sword or Shield? Early American For-
eign Policy and the Law of Nations, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 18-21 (1999) (citing
CHARLES R. RITCHESON, AFTERMATH OF REVOLUTION 19 (1969)).
5. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77,
596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95; Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
6. See Establishment of an International Law Commission, G.A. Res. 174(11), at
105, U.N. Doc. A/519 (Nov. 21, 1947).
7. See generally Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr.
29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29,
1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the
Living Resources of the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, 559 U.N.T.S. 285;
Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311;
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 387.
8. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 117 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR] (guaranteeing a
"broad spectrum of civil and political rights, rooted in basic democratic values and free-
doms," and obligating each State Party to respect and ensure these rights through legis-
lative or other necessary means).
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more fully below, the three branches of the U.S. federal govern-
ment have combined to minimize the range of treaty-based
rights that are to be applied by U.S. courts under the Supremacy
Clause. The courts, in particular, have declined to read the
Supremacy Clause to apply to treaty-based rights that, by the in-
tent of the drafters of the Clause, would seem legitimately to fall
within its reach. This approach by the courts in recent decades
contrasts with that of our nineteenth-century courts, which more
readily interpreted the Supremacy Clause to apply to rights iden-
tified in a treaty. This Article argues that the approach to trea-
ties taken early in the history of the Republic is more consistent
with the intended meaning of the Supremacy Clause than the
approach reflected in recent judicial practice.
I. THE ORIGIN OF THE SUPREMACY CLA USE
It was precisely the rights of individuals as specified in trea-
ties that prompted the Constitution's drafters to include the
treaty reference in the Supremacy Clause.9 British subjects had
been disadvantaged by the colonies during the revolt against
British rule in North America.' 0 The property of British nation-
als, as well as debts owed to them, had been confiscated by some
of the colonies. 1 When it came to negotiating a settlement, the
British insisted that the property rights of their subjects be re-
stored. 12 John Jay, Benjamin Franklin, and John Adams, negoti-
ating for the United States in Paris, acceded to this British de-
mand. i" In the Treaty of Paris, by which Britain recognized the
independence of the United States, the United States pledged to
restore rights to these British subjects. 14 Specifically, Article IV
9. See Carlos Manuel Vizquez, Treaty-Based ights and Remedies of Individuals, 92
COLU M. L. REv. 1082, 1104 (1992).
10. See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 199 (1796) (describing Virginia's se-
questration of British property during the American Revolution).
11. See id.
12. See Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 218 (noting that British Commissioners were partic-
ularly insistent regarding the security of British debts during the negotiation of the
Treaty of Paris).
13. See Treaty of Paris art. V, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80 ("It is agreed
that the Congress shall earnestly recommend it to the legislatures of the respective
states, to provide for the restitution of all estates, rights and properties, which have
been confiscated, belonging to real British subjects, and also of the estates, rights and
properties of persons resident in districts in the possession of his Majesty's arms, and
who have not borne arms against the said United States.").
14. See id.
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of the treaty proclaimed "that creditors on either side, shall meet
with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in
sterling money, of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted."15
In Virginia, British creditors encountered impediments:
unable to collect on a debt that the U.S. debtor had paid to the
government of Virginia, one British creditor sued, and the case
went to the U.S. Supreme Court (the "Supreme Court," or the
"Court") .16
Before the Supreme Court, the lawyers for the British credi-
tor were the first, after adoption of the Constitution, to ask a
U.S. court to implement the Supremacy Clause in favor of a liti-
gant. 7 They asserted that the creditor had a right to a judicial
remedy, arguing that:
The words that "creditors shall meet with no lawful impedi-
ment in the recovery of all such debts," mean, that when the
creditors apply to a court ofjustice, no law shall be pleaded in
bar to a judgment for their debts. What else, indeed, could
reasonably be the object of the British Minister, who was
bound to protect the commercial interests of his nation, and
who insisted on the insertion of the fourth article?18
In giving its decision, the Supreme Court referred to the
Supremacy Clause, found the Treaty of Paris' Article TV language
to apply, and granted recovery to the creditor. 9 Importantly,
the Court read the Supremacy Clause as creating affirmative
rights, and as providing a right of access to the courts. Justice
Paterson read Article IV as directly prescribing the case's result:
"This article reinstates the parties; the creditor and debtor
before the war, are creditor and debtor since; as they stood then,
they stand now. '20 ChiefJustice Chase read Article IV as giving a
creditor a cause of action in a court of law. He construed the
phrase "[t]o the recovery" to mean "to the right of action, judg-
ment, and execution, and receipt of the money, without impedi-
ments in courts of justice, which could only be by plea, (as in the
present case) or by proceedings, after judgment, to compel receipt
15. Id. art. IV.
16. See generally Ware, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
17. See id. at 204.
18. Id. at 218.
19. See id. at 284-85.
20. See id. at 256 (Paterson, J.).
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of paper money, or property, instead of sterling money. ' 21 The
court in effect voided the Virginia statute to protect the credi-
tor's treaty-based right.22
A. Nineteenth-Century Supremacy Clause Cases
These two propositions-that a treaty can give rights, and
that, if it does, the relevant courts must give a remedy-became
the accepted meaning of the Supremacy Clause. In 1819, for
example, Spain ceded territory in the American South to the
United States, and Spain and the United States agreed in the
treaty of cession that the property rights of persons holding land
grants from the Spanish Crown would be respected.2 3 Local au-
thorities, however, did not uniformly recognize Spanish land
grants. 24 The Supreme Court vindicated the rights of the grant-
ees, over and against the action of the local authorities, based on
the treaty's cession clause.25 The Court read the clause to pro-
vide for a continuity of title after the transfer of sovereignty. 26
Without seeing the need to explain why a remedy flows from the
right thus conferred, the Court gave a judicial remedy to the
person holding the Spanish grant.27
The courts of the constituent states likewise protected
treaty-based rights, in keeping with their obligations under the
Supremacy Clause. The issue arose in extradition situations. Ex-
tradition is a treaty-based practice, typically on the basis of a bi-
lateral treaty.28 In one case, a man was extradited from Canada
to Kentucky to be tried for forgery under an 1842 U.S.-British
treaty that included an extradition provision. 29 The man was ac-
quitted of forgery, but the public prosecutor then instituted pro-
21. Id. at 241 (Chase, C.J.) (emphasis added).
22. See id. at 235-37 (Chase, C.J.).
23. See generally Treaty of Amity, Settlement and Limits, U.S.-Spain, Feb. 22, 1819, 8
Stat. 252.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
25. See id. at 98.
26. See id. at 88.
27. See id. at 98.
28. See Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902) ("In the United States, the
general opinion and practice have been that extradition should be declined in the ab-
sence of conventional or legislative provision.").
29. See Commonwealth v. Hawes, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 697 (1878) (citing the Treaty
on Boundary, Slave Trade, and Extradition, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Aug. 9, 1842, 8 Stat. 572
[hereinafter U.S.-British Treaty]).
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ceedings against him for embezzlement.3" The man challenged
the propriety of preferring a new charge, on the grounds that
extradition law only entitles the receiving State to try the ex-
traditee on the charge for which extradition was sought and
granted. 1
The principle relied on, called the rule of specialty, 32 was
not even stated in the U.S.-British treaty, nor did the treaty say
anything about remedies for violations.33 It did not refer to an
individual subject to extradition as bearing rights of any kind.34
The Kentucky Court of Appeals, the state's highest court,
nonetheless enforced the restriction as requested by the ex-
traditee:
When it is provided by treaty that certain acts shall not be
done, or that certain limitations or restrictions shall not be
disregarded or exceeded by the contracting parties, the com-
pact does not need to be supplemented by legislative or exec-
utive action, to authorize the courts of justice to decline to
override those limitations or to exceed the prescribed restric-
tions, for the palpable and all-sufficient reason, that to do so
would be not only to violate the public faith, but to transgress
the "supreme law of the land." 5
The Kentucky court extrapolated from the obligation to extra-
dite only for named offenses the proposition that an extraditee
was protected as a matter of right from being charged with other
offenses, and that the extraditee was entitled to a remedy to en-
sure that protection."
In another case, two men were extradited from Canada to
Ohio on an offense specified as extraditable in the same U.S.-
British treaty.3" After their arrival, the county prosecutor tried to
30. See id. at 700-01.
31. See id. at 701.
32. By a principle of extradition law, called the rule of specialty, the requesting
State may try only for the offense on which extradition was sought. See, e.g., United
States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 424 (1886) ("[The right conferred upon persons
brought from a foreign country into this under such proceedings].. .is that he shall be
tried only for the offense with which he is charged in the extradition proceedings, and
for which he was delivered up.").
33. See U.S.-British Treaty, supra note 29, art. X.
34. See id.
35. Hawes, 76 Ky. at 702-03.
36. See id. at 712-13.
37. See State v. Vanderpool, 39 Ohio St. 273 (1883).
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take them to trial for an additional offense. 8 The Ohio trial
court read the treaty to give the accused a right to raise the
treaty violation. The trial judge said that "the obligations of this
treaty created a personal right in favor of the person extra-
dited. 39
At the time, a federal court and one state supreme court
had held that, in such situations, the violation of a treaty, and
any additional, related charges, could only be raised by the other
party to the treaty, and not by the accused.4" The Ohio Supreme
Court, however, found more persuasive the view of the Kentucky
Supreme Court and dismissed the additional charge.41 Refer-
ring to the Supremacy Clause, the Ohio Supreme Court said
that:
[The] treaty is... the law of the land, and the judges of every
state are as much bound thereby as they are by the constitu-
tion and laws of the Federal or State governments. It is there-
fore the imperative duty of the judicial tribunals of Ohio to
take cognizance of the rights of persons arising under a treaty
to the same extent as if they arose under a statute of the state
itself.
4 2
The court said, "if the courts cannot intervene... [the treaty] is
of little or no value as a protection to the person extradited. '
43
The Ohio Supreme Court considered the fact that another
remedy was potentially available, namely, that Britain could com-
plain to the United States by way of a diplomatic protest;4 4 but
the court viewed that remedy as inadequate.45 It wrote, "if it be
true, that the abuse of extradition proceedings, under this treaty,
is an offense for which the surrendering government alone can
complain, the remedy is totally inadequate, and the treaty itself
38. See id. at 274.
39. Id. (recounting the decision of the Ohio trial court).
40. See United States v. Caldwell, 25 F. Cas. 237 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1871) (No. 14,707);
see also United States v. Lawrence, 26 F. Cas. 879 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1876) (No. 15,573);
Adriance v. Lagrave, 59 N.Y. 110 (1874).
41. See Vanderpoo 39 Ohio St. at 279-80 ("[We think it clear that the court below
did not err in refusing to put the accused on trial for a crime for which they were not
extradited.").
42. Id. at 276-77.
43. Id. at 277.
44. See id. at 276.
45. See id.
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may be rendered nugatory. '46
The Ohio court rationalized that one aim of the treaty was
to protect each contracting party in its right to grant asylum to
persons persecuted for religious or political reasons: "The sole
object of the treaty was to enable each government to protect its
citizens and inhabitants in the right of asylum."47 The treaty
made no mention of a right of asylum,48 so the court was reading
quite a bit into the treaty to discern a right for an individual.
A federal trial court in another case similarly said that the
U.S.-British treaty could be set up by the individual as a bar to
prosecution:
For the [demanding] government to detain such person for
trial on any other charge would be not only an infraction of
the contract between the parties to the treaty, but also a viola-
tion of the supreme law of this land in a matter directly in-
volving his personal rights. A right of person or property, se-
cured or recognized by treaty, may be set up as a defense to a
prosecution in disregard of either, with the same force and
effect as if such right was secured by an act of congress.
The court viewed the extradition treaty as providing an ex-
traditee with a personal right for which the courts must give a
remedy.50
This same extradition issue reached the Supreme Court in
United States v. Rauscher.5 At issue was the extradition of a mur-
der suspect under the U.S.-British extradition treaty. 52 At the re-
quest of the United States, the United Kingdom extradited Rau-
scher to the United States to stand trial for murder, the federal
government seeking to prosecute for an act that occurred on the
high seas.53 After Rauscher arrived in the United States, the fed-
eral prosecutor did not proceed with a murder charge, but in-
stead charged Rauscher with another federal offense-infliction
46. Id. at 277.
47. Id. at 279.
48. See U.S.-British Treaty, supra note 29, art. X (providing for the mutual recogni-
tion of extradition requests, notwithstanding an extraditee's request for asylum, wher-
ever evidence of criminality sufficient tojustify apprehension in the Receiving State has
been found).
49. Ex parte Hibbs, 26 F. 421, 431 (D.C. Or. 1886).
50. See id.
51. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
52. See id. at 409.
53. See id.
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of cruel and unusual punishment.54
The federal trial court certified the following question to
the Supreme Court: "Did or not the prisoner, under the extradi-
tion treaty with Great Britain, having been surrendered upon a
charge of murder, acquire a right to be exempt from prosecu-
tion upon the charge set forth in the indictment... ?55
The Supreme Court reviewed the conflicting case law and
concluded that trial on a charge other than that on which the
person was surrendered was impermissible.56 The Court cited
approvingly the Kentucky and Ohio cases.5 7  Citing the
Supremacy Clause, the Court referred to "[t]he treaty of 1842"
as "the supreme law of the land, of which the courts are bound
to take judicial notice, and to enforce in any appropriate pro-
ceedings the rights of persons growing out of that treaty. '58 The
Court concluded that the extraditee had enforceable rights even
though the treaty concerned, in the first instance, only the two
States party to the extradition treaty:59
[I]t can hardly be supposed that a government which was
under no treaty obligation, nor any absolute obligation of
public duty, to seize a person who had found an asylum
within its bosom, and turn him over to another country for
trial, would be willing to do this, unless a case was made of
some specific offence of a character which justified the gov-
ernment in depriving the party of his asylum.6 °
In the text of the treaty, the rights and obligations ran only
between the two States. Each was obliged to extradite for certain
specified offenses if the requesting State made out a sufficient
case showing that the person had committed one of these of-
fenses within its jurisdiction.61 Nothing was said in the treaty
about the rights of an extraditee. Nonetheless, the Court found
a right and provided a remedy. It inferred from the text of the
treaty the proposition that trial could be had on no offense
54. See id.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 430.
57. See id. at 427-29 (citing Com v. Hawes, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 697 (1878) and State v.
Vanderpool, 39 Ohio St. 273 (1883)).
58. Id. at 419.
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 421.
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other than that on which extradition had been granted, and fur-
ther, that a right in this regard existed on the part of the person
extradited, and that such a person could raise that matter before
a court.
62
The Supreme Court focused on the purpose of the treaty,
which it said was to allow trial for certain specified crimes.63
From that aspect of the treaty the court inferred an obligation
on the part of the demanding State to refrain from trying for
other offenses, and a right of the extraditee not to be tried for
other offenses:
Nor can it be said that, in the exercise of such a delicate
power under a treaty so well guarded in every particular, its
provisions are obligatory alone on the State which makes the
surrender of the fugitive, and that that fugitive passes into the
hands of the country which charges him with the offence,
free from all the positive requirements and just implications
of the treaty under which the transfer of his person takes
place.64
II. CURRENT JUDICIAL PRACTICE
A. The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
The Supreme Court's approach to treaty-based rights in
Rauscher contrasts sharply with that of courts in recent cases.6 5
The issue has arisen with some frequency in cases involving the
consular access provision (Article 36) of the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations ("Vienna Convention")66
The Vienna Convention, like the treaty at issue in Rauscher,
provides rights, in the first instance, between nation states. It
requires States to facilitate the activity of consuls accredited to
them from other States," and to allow consuls of the so-called
sending State to carry out activities in aid of their co-nationals
62. See id. at 430.
63. See id. at 422-23.
64. Id. at 421.
65. See, e.g., State v. Tuck, 766 N.E.2d 1065 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (concluding that
individual rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, if they existed,
would not require the suppression of evidence obtained in connection with an Article
36 violation).
66. Vienna Convention, supra note 5, art. 36.
67. See id. art. 36(1)(b).
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who are present in the territory of the so-called receiving State.6 8
One such activity is assistance to co-nationals charged with
criminal offenses, or committed to incarceration upon a crimi-
nal conviction.6 9 The receiving State must allow a consul access
to a person held in police custody, so that the consul can provide
advice and material assistance to the co-national.7 °
The Vienna Convention views assistance by a consul as criti-
cal to a foreigner in ensuring the fairness of the proceedings, to
avert discrimination against the foreigner, to ensure that the for-
eigner understands the proceedings, and to ensure that the for-
eigner's life circumstances are understood by the court.71 Ac-
cording to instructions issued by the U.S. Department of State
(the "State Department") to U.S. consuls stationed abroad, con-
suls are to maintain lists of local attorneys to recommend to de-
tained U.S. nationals.72 They are to provide instruction on judi-
cial procedures in the receiving State, they are to check whether
a detainee has been physically abused while in custody, and they
are to ensure the adequacy of the physical conditions of deten-
tion.7 3
As a way of ensuring implementation, the Vienna Conven-
tion requires the arresting authorities to inform the foreign na-
tional that the foreign national may contact a consul.7 4 Unlike
the 1842 U.S.-British treaty, the Vienna Convention expressly re-
fers to the individual and invests that individual with certain
rights:
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions
relating to nationals of the sending State:
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with na-
tionals of the sending State and to have access to them. Na-
tionals of the sending State shall have the same freedom with
68. See id.
69. See id. art. 36(1)(c).
70. See id.
71. See Vienna Convention, supra note 5, art. 5.
72. See U.S. Dep't of State [State Dep't], Foreign Affairs Manual & Foreign Affairs
Handbooks, Judicial Assistance Abroad, 7 FAM Consular Affairs, at 990 (2005), available at
http://foia.state.gov/masterdocs/07fam/07m0990.pdf.
73. See LuKE T. LEE, CONSULAR LAW AND PRACTICE 124-29 (2d ed. 1991) (outlining
services a consul may provide to a detainee); see also id. at 166-67 (outlining U.S. Depart-
ment of State ("State Department") instructions to U.S. consuls).
74. See id. at 164.
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respect to communication with and access to consular officers
of the sending State;
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiv-
ing State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the
sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that
State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pend-
ing trial or is detained in any other manner. Any communi-
cation addressed to the consular post by the person arrested,
in prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the
said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall in-
form the person concerned without delay of his rights under
this sub-paragraph [. 75
The International Court ofJustice ("ICJ") reads this provision as
conferring a right on the foreign national.7 6 This language
speaks clearly of a right to the foreign national, thus rendering
the provision self-executing under the analysis of that issue set by
the Supreme Court early on in the history of the republic.7 7
Additionally, the Vienna Convention contains a provision
on judicial implementation of the right thus defined.7 8
In a sub-paragraph immediately following, the Vienna Con-
vention states:
The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be
exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the
receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said
laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the
purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are
intended.7 9
This sub-paragraph is addressed to courts carrying out criminal
proceedings against a foreign national. Thus, the Vienna Con-
vention not only characterizes the foreign national as a bearer of
a right, but specifies that this right should be implemented by
the courts, in a way that gives "full effect" to the right.8 0 The ICJ
75. Vienna Convention, supra note 5, art. 36, 1.
76. See LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 494 (June 27).
77. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829); see also United States v.
Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 88-89 (1833).
78. See Vienna Convention, supra note 5, art. 36, 2.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 1 (Mar.
31), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm (noting the requirement
that "full effect" be "given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under [Article
36] are intended.").
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reads this second paragraph to mean that a judicial remedy is
required when Article 36 is violated."1
Despite the apparent clarity of Article 36, federal and state
courtjudges have shown reluctance to recognize that the foreign
national is a bearer of a right, or has a remedy in court.8 2 For-
eign nationals have moved to suppress incriminating statements
made by them before they had been informed by police authori-
ties of their right to contact a consul.8 " If being informed of the
right of consular access is a right that adheres to the individual
foreign national, and if a judicial remedy is mandated by the
Vienna Convention, one would expect suppression as a judicial
remedy. Nonetheless, in United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, the
U.S. Court of Appeals denied suppression as a remedy, saying
that "the Vienna Convention is silent and therefore ambiguous,
at best on whether or not suppression is an appropriate rem-
edy."8 4 Most other state and federal courts that have addressed
the issue have reached the same result, namely, that suppression
is not required. 5 Courts have said that even if Article 36 can be
read to create a right, no remedy is required in the event of
breach.8 6
81. See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 497-98.
82. See, e.g., United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 888 (2000) (hold-
ing that a foreign national's post-arrest statements should not be excluded solely be-
cause he made them before being told of his Article 36 right to consular notification).
83. See, e.g., id. at 884.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., United States v. Minjares-Alvarez, 264 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2001)
(stating that "suppression is not an appropriate remedy for a violation of Article 36 of
the Vienna Convention," and that nothing in Vienna Convention text requires suppres-
sion as a remedy); United States v. Felix-Felix, 275 F.3d 627, 635 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating
that suppression of a statement is not a proper remedy for an Article 36 violation);
United States v. Carrillo, 269 F.3d 761, 771 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating that suppression of a
statement is not a proper remedy); United States v. Cowo, 22 F. App'x 25, 26 (1st Cir.
2001) (stating that neither suppression of an incriminating statement nor dismissal of
an indictment is an appropriate remedy); Lopez v. State, 558 S.E.2d 698, 700 (Ga. 2002)
(noting that "nothing in [the Vienna Convention] text requires the suppression of evi-
dence," and concluding that, by its terms: the text does not require application of the
exclusionary rule; such a judicially-created remedy cannot be imposed absent a viola-
tion of a constitutional right; and any rights created by the Vienna Convention do not
rise to the level of a constitutional right); State v. Issa, 752 N.E.2d 904, 914-15 (Ohio
2001) (stating that a treaty based right is on a par with a statutory right, and that the
exclusionary rule is used only for constitutional violations).
86. See, e.g., State v. Tuck, 766 N.E.2d 1065, 1067 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (finding
that even if Article 36 gives a right to the individual, that right does not rise to the level
of a constitutional right); see also supra note 85.
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The reluctance of modern U.S. courts to implement the
Supremacy Clause in the Vienna Convention cases stands in
marked contrast to the willingness of the Supreme Court in Rau-
scher to read a treaty provision to discern an individual right
where none is mentioned, and to provide a remedy even though
that matter too is not addressed in the treaty provision.
In nineteenth-century practice, courts that found a right in
a treaty provision never asked themselves whether ajudicial rem-
edy need be given.88 To those judges, the answer was obvious.
The Supremacy Clause said that treaties were binding on the
courts.89 No additional analysis was required.
It is, moreover, accepted in the law that when one has a
right, one is entitled to a remedy. The Latin maxim ubi jus, ibi
remedium ("where there is a right, there is a remedy") expresses a
fundamental notion of the rule of law and of the role of courts
in ensuring compliance with the law. Courts hearing Vienna
Convention cases have raised the issue of a judicial remedy as a
matter divorced from that of a right, and have thereby subverted
the Supremacy Clause.9 °
B. The Role of the Federal Executive
The failure of the courts to implement the treaty-based
right of consular access has been facilitated by the executive
branch. In the positions it has taken before international tribu-
nals, in policy statements it has published, and in representa-
tions made directly to federal courts, the State Department has
maintained, contrary to the clear text of the Vienna Convention,
that the right of consular access relates only to the two States
involved-the receiving State and the sending State-but not to
a foreign national detainee. 91
In a letter addressing questions posed by the First Circuit
Court of Appeals, the State Department said: "The right of an
individual to communicate with his consular officials is derivative
of the sending state's right to extend consular protection to its
87. See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 419 (1886).
88. See, e.g., id.
89. See id.
90. See supra note 85.
91. See Letter from David Andrews, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, to James I.
Robinson, Assistant Att'y Gen. (Oct. 15, 1999), available at http://www.state.gov/docu-
ments/organization/7111 .doc.
566 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 29:55 2
nationals," and therefore the Vienna Convention does not estab-
lish "rights of individuals.
9 2
In concluding that the Vienna Convention creates no rights
for an individual, the State Department focused on language in
the Vienna Convention preamble that, it said, negated consular
access as a right of the individual. The preamble phrase reads:
"Realizing that the purpose of such privileges and immunities is
not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient perform-
ance of functions by consular posts on behalf of their respective
States. 
'93
The Solicitor-General of the United States, also citing this
preamble language, told the Supreme Court that consular access
is not a right that adheres to a detained foreign national.9 4 Even
after the ICJ had construed Article 36 as providing a right to an
individual, the Solicitor-General again cited the preamble lan-
guage and told the Supreme Court that it need not follow the
ICJ's view.95 The Solicitor-General repeated that Article 36 cre-
ated no justiciable right, and that courts need not provide review
of a conviction in the event of a violation.96 "Nothing in the
Vienna Convention," he wrote, "provides that the 'rights' speci-
fied in Article 36(1) (b) may be privately enforced in a criminal
proceeding."97 Additionally, "a foreign national does not have a
private right to seek to have his conviction or sentence over-
turned."98
The reliance of the State Department and the Solicitor-Gen-
eral on the preamble language of the Vienna Convention dis-
torted the meaning of the treaty to avoid the remedy the treaty
clearly requires. The preamble language is an obvious reference
to the privileges of consuls, and to the several provisions of the
Vienna Convention that exempt consuls from judicial process so
that that they may carry out their consular tasks. Those privi-
92. Id. at Attachment A (Department of State Answers to the Questions Posed by
the First Circuit in United States v. Nai Fook Li).
93. Vienna Convention, supra note 5, at pmbl.
94. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 19 n.3, 37, Breard v. Greene,
523 U.S. 371 (1998) (No. 97-1390 (A-738) and No. 97-8214 (A-732)).
95. See id.
96. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Me-
dellin v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2088 (2005) (No. 04-5928), 2005 WL 504490, at *18 [herein-
after Medellin Brief for the United States].
97. Id. at *20.
98. Id.
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leges are given to consuls, not to benefit the individual consul,
although the effect may be a benefit, but to benefit the govern-
ment in whose service the consul works. It is in this sense that
the preamble clause states that the purpose of the Vienna Con-
vention is not to benefit individuals. The preamble clause has
no relation to the right afforded in Article 36 to a foreign na-
tional.9 9 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights ("Inter-
American Court") stated as much in a case involving the Vienna
Convention. °° The State Department had made its preamble
argument to the court, after the court was asked to issue an advi-
sory opinion on the topic of consular access. The Inter-Ameri-
can Court considered the State Department's argument, but re-
jected it, concluding to the contrary that the term "individuals"
in the Vienna Convention preamble refers only to consular of-
ficers.' 0
C. The Medellin Litigation
In 2004, the Supreme Court for the first time granted certi-
orari in a case that would have required it to decide whether the
Vienna Convention gives a right to a foreign national, and
whether a judicial remedy flows from such a right. 0 2 The case
also presented the question of whether U.S. courts must follow
the conclusion on these points as made in a then recently de-
cided case of the ICJ.' °3 Mexico had sued the United States for
disregarding the Vienna Convention in the cases of Mexican na-
tionals convicted on capital charges in various U.S. state courts,
and the ICJ had found the United States in default of its obliga-
tions for failing to review convictions when consular access had
not been explained at the time of arrest to Mexican nationals. 1 4
99. See The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the
Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) No. 16, 74 (1999) ("Having examined the travaux praratoires for the pream-
ble of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the Court finds that the 'individu-
als' to whom it refers are those who perform consular functions, and that the clarifica-
tion cited above was intended to make it clear that the privileges and immunities
granted to them were for the performance of their functions.").
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004) (granting certiorari).
103. See Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2088, 2089 (2005).
104. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 1 (Mar.
31), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm.
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President George W. Bush intervened to avert Supreme
Court resolution of the matter.11 5 The President ordered the
state courts that had convicted the Mexican nationals to provide
those nationals with the review found necessary by the ICJ."°6
He then asked the Supreme Court to reject the case, even after
having granted certiorari, to let the state courts review Medel-
lin's conviction, and those of the other Mexican nationals
named by Mexico in the Avena case.' 07 The courts of the states
on whose death rows these Mexican nationals sat would inquire
whether the violation of the obligation to inform about consular
access had caused prejudice. 0 8
Following upon that presidential memorandum, Medellin's
lawyers filed a habeas corpus petition with the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals, and the Supreme Court decided that, given
that filing and the President's memorandum, it did not need to
hear the case. 0 9 It decided that it had granted certiorari im-
providently. 10 By this stratagem, the President was able to avert
a decision on the merits that may well have gone against the U.S.
government's position. The views expressed by the justices as
the court's majority deciding that certiorari had been improvi-
dently granted suggested that the Court was sharply divided on
the question of whether Vienna Convention Article 36 affords a
justiciable right to a foreign national, and whether judicial re-
view is required when Article 36 is violated. 1 '
In further action to avert an implementation of the
Supremacy Clause with respect to the Vienna Convention, Presi-
dent Bush withdrew the U.S. ratification of the Optional Proto-
col to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning
the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes in 2005."12 This proto-
105. See Medellin, 125 S. Ct. at 2090.
106. See id.
107. See id. (citing Medellin Brief for the United States, supra note 96, app. 2, 2005
WL 504490, at *laa).
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See generally id.
112. See generally Frederic L. Kirgis, President Bush's Determination Regarding Mexican
Nationals and Consular Convention Rights (Mar. 2005), in AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L L. [ASIL]
INSGHRT, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/03/insightsO50309a.html
(describing the United States' decision to withdraw from the Optional Protocol and
outlining the possible domestic and international legal consequences of this with-
drawal).
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col allows States Parties to the Vienna Convention to sue each
other in the ICJ for breach of the convention. 13 In a letter to
the U.N. Secretary-General, the United States declared its with-
drawal as follows: "This letter constitutes notification by the
United States of America that it hereby withdraws from the
aforesaid Protocol. As a consequence of this withdrawal, the
United States will no longer recognize the jurisdiction of the ICJ
reflected in that Protocol." '114
The Avena decision had left open the important question of
what kind of harm, if any, must befall a foreign national who was
not informed about consular access in the processing of the case
before judicial relief must be granted.1 15 Precluding future cases
limited the possibility that the ICJ might find lacking whatever
standard might be used by U.S. courts.
Contrary to the position of the State Department and Solici-
tor-General, States party to the Vienna Convention read Article
36 to provide ajusticiable right. Forty-nine European States sub-
mitted an amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court in Medellin
to urge the Court to find that a right is created and that violation
of that right requires a judicial remedy.116
D. Cases Properly Implementing the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations
Some lower courtjudges have taken an approach more con-
sistent with the Supremacy Clause and with that of the Supreme
Court in Rauscher. A federal district judge in Illinois found that a
judicial remedy is required for a consular access violation and
ruled that the ICJ decision in LaGrand "conclusively determines
that Article 36 of the Vienna Convention creates individually en-
forceable rights, resolving the question most American courts
... have left open."1" 7
An Oklahoma court ordered review of a foreign national's
113. See Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Con-
cerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 18, 1961, 596 U.N.T.S. 487.
114. Kirgis, supra note 112.
115. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 1 (Mar.
31), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm.
116. See Brief of Amici Curiae the European Union and Members of the Interna-
tional Community in Support of Petitioner, Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2088 (2005)
(No. 04-5928), 2005 WL 152924 at *7.
117. U.S. ex rel. Madej v. Schomig, 223 F. Supp. 2d 968, 979 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (citing
LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 494 (June 27)).
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conviction, citing a Vienna Convention violation. 1 ' Osbaldo
Torres, a Mexican national named by Mexico in the Avena litiga-
tion, sought a stay of his execution, citing the ICJ ruling in
Avena.1 9 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals granted a
stay and ordered a hearing to determine whether the Article 36
violation had prejudiced Torres' defense.1 21 Onejudge in a con-
curring opinion said that the Oklahoma court was required to
comply with the decision of the ICJ in Avena, and thus to read
the Vienna Convention as providing an individual right and a
remedy. 121
E. The Geneva Prisoners of War Convention
Another example of a treaty that is not receiving proper im-
plementation is the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treat-
ment of Prisoners of War ("Third Geneva Convention"). 22 The
Third Geneva Convention requires that a prisoner of war, if
tried for a criminal offense, must be tried in the same procedure
that would be used by the relevant State to try its own military
personnel. 12' Further, if doubt arises as to whether a person in
custody is a prisoner of war, a determination on that issue must
be made by "a competent tribunal.' '1 24
These issues arose in the case of Salim Hamdan, who was
captured by U.S. forces in Afghanistan and transported to the
U.S. detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 125 The Presi-
dent ordered that he be tried for various offenses before a mili-
tary commission that the President had established.1 26 In a U.S.
district court, Hamdan challenged this procedure as not being
the procedure whereby U.S. military personnel would be tried
for criminal offenses, and the court agreed.1 27 When the gov-
118. See Torres v. State, 120 P. 3d 1183 (2005); see also Torres v. State, No. 2004-
442, slip op. (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004) (Order Granting Stay of Execution and
Remanding Case for Evidentiary Hearing).
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id. (Chapel, J., specially concurring).
122. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention].
123. See id. art. 102.
124. Id. art. 5.
125. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 155 (D.D.C. 2004).
126. See id.
127. See id. at 160.
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ernment replied that it did not consider Hamdan a prisoner of
war, the court relied on the Geneva Convention provision re-
quiring that in case of doubt the determination must be made by
a competent tribunal.12 The court said that no such determina-
tion had been made. 129
The government then replied that the relevant provisions of
the Third Geneva Convention are not self-executing. 3 ° The
court responded that the statute providing for the possibility of
trial by military commission limited such proceedings to "offend-
ers ... triable under the law of war," and thus that the statute
referenced the law of war, which includes the Third Geneva
Convention.1 3' The court found, moreover, that the relevant
provisions of the Third Geneva Convention were self-executing
and therefore were to be applied under the Supremacy
Clause. 132 To reach that conclusion, the court cited the Su-
preme Court's Head Money Cases, in which the Supreme Court
said that treaty provisions providing rights fall under the
Supremacy Clause to be implemented by the courts.1 3 3 The
court said that the Geneva Conventions "were written to protect
individuals," and that nothing in the Convention "manifests the
contracting parties' intention that it not become effective as do-
mestic law without the enactment of implementing legisla-
tion."' 34 The court, therefore, granted Hamdan's petition that
he not be tried before a military commission.'3 5
The district court's analysis reflected appropriate imple-
mentation of the Supremacy Clause. On appeal, however, a
three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cir-
cuit reversed.'1 6 The panel did so in an opinion that cites, but
misuses, nineteenth-century Supreme Court case law on the
Supremacy Clause.1 3v The opinion is the more worrying because
128. See id. at 161.
129. See id. at 162.
130. See id. at 163-64.
131. Id. at 164.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 164-65 (citing Head Money Cases v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99
(1884)).
134. Id. at 165.
135. See id. at 173-74.
136. Hamdan v. Rurnsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 74
U.S.L.W. 3287 (U.S. Nov. 7, 2005) (No. 05-184).
137. Id. at 38-39.
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one panel member was Judge Roberts, who shortly thereafter be-
came Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.'
Rejecting the district court's conclusion regarding the
Third Geneva Convention, the panel said "that the 1949 Geneva
Convention does not confer upon Hamdan a right to enforce its
provisions in court."1"9 In reaching this conclusion, the panel
quoted language from the Head Money Cases, writing that a
"treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations,"
and that in the event of a violation, this "becomes the subject of
international negotiations and reclamation, not the subject of a
lawsuit." 4 °
The panel's quotation from the Head Money Cases, while ac-
curate, was misleading. The panel omitted the language imme-
diately following what it quoted, in which the Supreme Court
made clear that many treaty provisions are justiciable."' Specifi-
cally, the Supreme Court had written:
But a treaty may also contain provisions which confer certain
rights upon the citizens or subjects of one of the nations re-
siding in the territorial limits of the other, which partake of
the nature of municipal law, and which are capable of en-
forcement as between private parties in the courts .... A
treaty, then, is a law of the land as an act of Congress is, when-
ever its provisions prescribe a rule by which the rights of the
private citizen or subject may be determined. 42
In such a situation, the Supreme Court continued, a court "re-
sorts to the treaty for a rule of decision for the case before it as it
would to a statute." 4 ' By quoting the Head Money Cases so selec-
tively, the panel turned the Supreme Court's meaning on its
head. Any treaty violation may lead a contracting State to pro-
test, but this fact is irrelevant to the question of whether one or
another treaty provision is self-executing.
In resolving the Third Geneva Convention issue against
Hamdan, the panel relied on a footnote in Johnson v. Eisentrager,
in which the Supreme Court discussed not the Third Geneva
138. Id. at 34.
139. Id. at 40.
140. Id. at 38-39 (quoting Head Money Cases v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 598
(1884)).
141. See Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598-99.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 599.
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Convention, but an earlier prisoner convention of 1929, and in
which it said that the parties to the 1929 convention contem-
plated enforcement at the inter-governmental level, rather than
by courts. 14 4 However, the Supreme Court in Eisentrager, despite
this statement, considered in detail the merits of the individual's
arguments that his rights under the 1929 convention had been
violated and found them wanting.14 The 1929 convention,
moreover, had no provision comparable to Article 5 of the 1949
convention, which states that, in case of doubt about whether a
person is a prisoner of war, the issue must be resolved by a com-
petent tribunal. 14
6
The panel did not analyze Article 5 to determine whether it
is self-executing. Nonetheless, the panel said, "This aspect of
Eisentrageris still good law and demands our adherence."147 This
statement appears to consider the footnote in Eisentrager to be
binding precedent. 148 The panel did not mention the Supreme
Court decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, in which both a four-mem-
ber plurality and a two-judge concurring group discussed the
Third Geneva Convention as relevant to determining the status
of a person who was challenging that status in a judicial fo-
rum. 
149
F. Human Rights Treaties and Self-Execution
The U.S. federal executive has also facilitated non-imple-
mentation of treaty-based rights by promoting the inclusion of
so-called "non-self-execution" clauses when the Senate gives con-
sent to the ratification of human rights treaties.' ° The aim is to
144. See Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 39 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789
n.14 (1950)).
145. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 789.
146. Compare Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27,
1929, 47 Stat. 2021, 118 L.N.T.S 343, with Third Geneva Convention, supra note 122,
art. 5 ("[S]uch persons shall enjoy protection of the present Convention until such time
as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.").
147. Hamdan II, 415 F.3d at 39.
148. See id. (citing Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 789 n.14).
149. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520, 538 (2004) (O'Connor, J., plurality
opinion) ("[Mlilitary regulations already provide for such process in related instances,
dictating that tribunals be made available to determine the status of enemy detainees
who assert prisoner-of-war status under the Geneva Convention."); see also id. at 549
(Souter, J.,joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) ("[Hamdi] would therefore
seem to qualify for treatment as prisoner of war under the Third Geneva Convention.").
150. See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of
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ratify, but to avoid applying the treaties as domestic law.
The United States criticized many governments for human
rights violations but was itself frequently criticized for not having
ratified human rights treaties. 151  By the 1980s, "United States
foreign policy required U.S. support for, if not leadership in, the
international human rights movement, and required U.S. adher-
ence to international human rights conventions."152 It was in
this posture that President George H.W. Bush took major
human rights treaties to the Senate, seeking its consent to ratifi-
cation. 15' The United States would ratify, but the Senate would
declare that the operative provision were not self-executing. 154
When the Senate gave consent to ratification of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), the
Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 347-48 (1995) (noting that the Reagan, George
H.W. Bush, and Clinton administrations requested non-self-executing declarations or
failed to seek implementing legislation in relation to human rights covenants).
151. See, e.g., id. at 343-44:
Even friends of the United States have objected that its reservations are incom-
patible with that object and purpose and are therefore invalid. By adhering to
human rights conventions subject to these reservations, the United States, it is
charged, is pretending to assume international obligations but in fact is under-
taking nothing.
Id.
152. Id. at 349.
153. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong. 4-5, 16 (1991) (statement of Assistant Sec'y of
State Richard Schifter) (quoting Letter on the [International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights] from President George H.W. Bush to the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations (Aug. 8, 1991)) ("[R]atification would also strengthen our ability to influence
the development or appropriate human rights principles in the international commu-
nity, and provide an additional and effective tool in our efforts to improve respect for
fundamental freedoms in many problem countries around the world."); see also Conven-
tion Against Torture: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 10 1st Cong. 5, 8
(1990) (statement of Hon. Abraham Sofaer, Legal Adviser, Dep't of State) ("[W]e must
stand with other nations in pledging to bring to justice those who engage in torture...
and this why we support this convention.").
154. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrad-
ing Treatment or Punishment, Declarations and Reservations, opened for signature Dec.
10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S 85, available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratifi-
cation/9.htm [hereinafter Torture Convention]; see also ICCPR; Henkin, supra note
150, at 347-48 (noting that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR") and the International Convention Against All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion ("Race Convention") (opened for signature Dec. 12, 1965, 60 U.N.T.S 195) have both
been ratified with non-self-executing declarations); Jordan Paust, Avoiding "Fraudulent"
Executive Policy: Analysis of Non-Self-Execution of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42
DEPAUL L. Rav. 1257 (1993) (noting that the Senate accepted George H.W. Bush's
recommendation that the ICCPR be non-self-executing).
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Convention Against Torture, and the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, it de-
clared that their rights-guarantee provisions were not to be self-
executing. 15
5
The legal significance of these declarations remains un-
clear. In one of very few relevant precedents, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that a Senate statement that
was part of a resolution of consent was of no effect.t 56 The case
concerned a treaty with Canada that provided for joint produc-
tion of electrical power at the U.S.-Canadian border.1 57 In its
resolution of consent to the treaty, the Senate provided that the
U.S. share of the power to be generated would be allocated only
by an act of Congress. 15' New York applied to the Federal Power
Commission for a license for a project that would use all the
water that, under the treaty, fell to the United States for its
use.159 The Federal Power Commission objected to New York's
action, asserting, on the basis of the Senate statement, that only
the federal government might allocate the power.' 60 The Court
of Appeals sided with New York. 1 6 1 In doing so, the court noted
that the Senate's statement was outside the text of the treaty. 1
62
The court said that the statement was not a reservation because
it did not affect relations between Canada and the United States
under the treaty. 163 Hence, the Senate statement was of no ef-
fect in domestic law. The court remanded the matter to the Fed-
eral Power Commission, which, in the court's view, was author-
ized to act on New York's application.'64
The Constitution does not grant the Senate power to im-
pose a condition that affects the implementation of a treaty.
155. See 140 CONG. REc. 14326 (June 24, 1994) (stating recommended declarations
to the Race Convention); see also 138 CONG. REc. 8071 (Apr. 2, 1992) (stating recom-
mended declarations to the ICCPR); 136 CONG. REc. 36198 (Oct. 27, 1990) (stating
recommended declarations to the Torture Convention).
156. See Power Auth. of N.Y. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 247 F.2d 538, 543 (D.C. Cir.
1957).
157. See id. at 539 n.1, 540 (citing Niagara River, Water Diversion art. VI, Feb. 27,
1950, U.S.-Can., 1 U.S.T 694, 697 [hereinafter Niagara River Treaty]).
158. See id. at 539 (citing Niagara River Treaty, supra note 157, at 699).
159. See id.
160. See id. at 539-40.
161. See id. at 544.
162. See id. at 543.
163. See id. at 541-42.
164. See id. at 544.
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The Senate may make suggestions prior to giving consent, and if
the President declines the suggestions the Senate may refuse its
consent. 165 Senate statements accompanying acts of consent are,
however, not binding on the courts.'66 The power to make trea-
ties is that of the President: "[The President] shall have Power,
by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Trea-
ties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur. ." 167
To date, U.S. courts have mainly allowed the Senate and the
President to keep rights specified in ratified human rights trea-
ties out of court. The courts have been reluctant to view ratified
human rights treaties as relevant to deciding issues of rights. No
case has squarely presented to the Supreme Court the issue of
the domestic applicability of ratified human rights treaties en-
cumbered by a "non-self-execution" clause. In one case, the
Court made passing reference to the ICCPR, saying that the Sen-
ate had "declined to give the federal courts the task of interpret-
ing and applying human rights law, as when its ratification of the
[ICCPR] declared that the substantive provisions of the docu-
ment were not self-executing."' 68
In making this statement, the Court mischaracterized the
treaty process by inaccurately referring to the Senate as the body
that ratified the ICCPR.'69 Under the Constitution, it is the Pres-
ident who ratifies a treaty.' 70 The Senate merely gives consent to
the President, who may then ratify but is not required to. 7'
Thus, whatever the Senate may have intended by the declara-
tion, the Senate's action was not an act of ratification.
More important than this mistake about the treaty ratifica-
tion process, it is not obvious that the Senate, by virtue of its
declaration on non-self-execution, intended that the courts not
165. See generally 14 DIG. INT'L L. 138 (Marjorie M. Whiteman ed., 1970).
166. See Paust, supra note 58, at 1266-67; see also David Weissbrodt, United States
Ratification of the Human Rights Covenants, 63 MINN. L. REv. 35, 67-69 (1978) (noting that
non-self-executing declarations remove the question of whether or not treaties are self-
executing from the courts).
167. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
168. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004) (citing 138 CONG. REC.
S8071 (1992)).
169. See id.
170. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("He shall have Power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators pre-
sent concur.").
171. See id.
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interpret or apply the substantive provisions of the ICCPR. It
may have meant, more modestly, that a federal cause of action
not be created by the ICCPR, given that one already exists in
federal courts for violation of a treaty. United States district
courts have "original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
172
In its report on the ICCPR, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee said, "[t]he intent [behind the declaration about
self-execution] is to clarify that the [ICCPR] will not create a
private cause of action in U.S. courts."173 Under federal statu-
tory law, a private cause of action already exists for a suit based
on a treaty provision.'
7 4
Whatever the situation regarding suits in which a plaintiff
claims a right based on a treaty, the Senate expressed no intent
to preclude a person from invoking rights-guarantee provisions
defensively, to avert adverse governmental action. The existence
of a cause of action is irrelevant when a party seeks to invoke a
treaty provision defensively.1 7 5 Although the contrary position
has been argued, 176 there appears to be no bar, arising from the
Senate declaration or any other source, against relying on a pro-
172. See id. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority ."); see also 28 U.S.C. 1331 ("The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Consti-
tution, laws, or treaties of the United States.").
173. Comm. on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, S. Exec. Rep. No. 102-23, at 19
(1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 645, 648 (1992).
174. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 809-810 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Bork, J., concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985) (rejecting suits based on
five treaties on grounds that the treaty provisions were not self-executing, and thereby
implying that the suits could have been maintained if based on self-executing treaty
provisions); Saipan v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974) (allowing
private parties to base action on trusteeship agreement between United States and U.N.
Security Council); Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1425-26 (C.D. Cal. 1985)
(rejecting suits based on two treaties on grounds that the treaty provisions were not self-
executing, and thereby implying that the suits could have been maintained if based on
self-executing treaty provisions); cf Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 194 (D. Mass.
1995) (suggesting in dictum that a cause of action exists under a treaty only if an act of
Congress creates one for the particular treaty).
175. See Vdzquez, supra note 9, at 1143; see also Connie de la Vega, Civil Rights
During the 1990s: New Treaty Law Could Help Immensely, 65 U. CIN. L. REv. 423, 451 n.185
(1997).
176. See Jacques Semmelman, Federal Courts, the Constitution, and the Rule of Non-
Inquiry in International Extradition Proceedings, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1198, 1224-25 (1991).
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vision of the ICCPR from a defensive posture, as when a person
is accused of crime, or is contesting extradition.
Many lower court judges have referred to the Senate decla-
ration as if it were binding, although these references have typi-
cally been in passing, with no analysis."' 7 The U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit said in one case that the ICCPR does
not create privately enforceable rights for a plaintiff, because of
the Senate's declaration." 8 In that case, however, the court ana-
lyzed the ICCPR provision on which the plaintiff relied and
found that it did not aid the plaintiffs cause. 179
G. Reasons for the Shift in Court Practice
The question arises: why would the implementation of the
Supremacy Clause for treaty-based rights seem axiomatic to a
nineteenth-century judge yet problematic to many judges today?
One possible reason is that in the nineteenth century the United
States was a new nation, seeking respectability after its unortho-
dox separation from the British empire. 180 Nineteenth-century
judges seemed at pains to show that the United States respected
the rules of the international community.181 The United States
was a renegade for having raised arms to liberate itself from Brit-
ain, but having done so, it needed the consent of nations in or-
der to function.1 82
By the twentieth century, that sense had dissipated. The
United States had developed a sense of superiority over the Old
World. 8 ' It no longer needed to prove itself. The United States
177. See, e.g., Naoum v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 300 F. Supp. 2d 521, 527 (N.D. Ohio
2004).
178. See Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8, 10 n.1 (1st Cir. 1994).
179. See id.
180. See Robert Kagan, Power and Weakness, 113 POL'Y REv. 3, 6 (2002), available at
http://www.policyreview.org/JUN02/kagan.html (characterizing U.S. foreign policy in
the early nineteenth century as defined by weakness relative to European powers); cf
Thomas H. Lee, The Supreme Court of the United States as Quasi-International Tribunal: Re-
claiming the Court's Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction Over Treaty-Based Suits by Foreign States
Against States, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1765, 1769 (2004) (suggesting that the "young, weak
Republic" was threatened by individual state defections and the possibility of war with a
foreign power).
181. See supra Part I.A.
182. See Kagan, supra note 180.
183. Cf Lee, supra note 180, at 1770 (noting change in Supreme Court jurispru-
dence after 1934, "when the great-power status of the United States in the world bal-
ance was incontestable").
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was the land of democracy, a land where one rose by merit. This
perception may have overlooked some unpleasant realities of
the late nineteenth-century United States, where electoral polit-
ics were something less than the ideal of legislators representing
the people and working for the public good, and where the af-
termath of slavery hardly equated with democracy. 184 Nonethe-
less, the self-image of the United States was changing.
World War II reinforced this new perception. The United
States had saved the world, at a time when the Old World powers
were on their knees. The United States promoted human rights
in the world.1 5 The United States advocated adoption of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Na-
tions,186 but international protection of human rights was not to
be used against the United States to inquire into race segrega-
tion.18 7 When it was proposed to the U.N. Human Rights Com-
mission to study U.S. racial segregation, the United States re-
sisted.'88
Nonetheless, the United States promoted the adoption of
human rights instruments, in part in reaction to the World War
II atrocities, and in part to demonstrate the inferiority of the
socialist bloc powers.1 8 9 When it came to ratification of human
rights treaties, the racial situation in the United States proved to
be an obstacle. In the 1950s, the Senate refused ratification,
fearing that the dirty laundry of segregation might be aired on a
world stage.' 90 As tens of nations ratified human rights treaties,
184. See generally PAUL LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:
VISIONS SEEN (1998); CAROL ANDERSON, EYEs OFF THE PRIZE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND
THE AFRICAN AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 1944-1955 (2003).
185. See Harold Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century,
46 ST. Louis U. LJ. 293, 301-06 (2002) (narrating the evolution of U.S. human rights
policy).
186. See Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Condi-
tional Consent, 14 U. PA. L. REv. 399, 410-12 (2000) (narrating U.S. involvement in the
creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
187. See Nasu Taylor Saito, Crossing the Border: The Interdependence of Foreign Policy
and Racial Justice in the United States, 1 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEv. L.J. 53, 76-81 (1998)
(describing history of slavery-related international law prohibitions in the United
States).
188. See, e.g., LAUREN, supra note 184, at 226-27 (discussing U.S. resistance to
United Nations ("U.N.") study of racial segregation); ANDERSON, supra note 184, at 75-
112 (discussing same).
189. See generally MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE
OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000).
190. See id. at 43-64.
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the United States balked.191
One factor inhibiting proper implementation of treaty-
based rights is that the Supremacy Clause limits the rights of the
states over and against the federal government. Treaties are fed-
eral law, and to the extent that rights provisions in treaties re-
quire states to change their practices, federal power rises and
state power diminishes. Judges may be reluctant to reduce the
power of the states, even if that is what the Framers contem-
plated when they inserted a reference to treaties in the
Supremacy Clause.
Law schools do not focus on the Supremacy Clause's men-
tion of treaties, in constitutional law courses. When a judge is
told by an attorney that the Supremacy Clause requires imple-
mentation of a treaty provision, the judge may have no experi-
ence from which to assess the argument.
III. PROPER JUDICIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
SUPREMACY CLA USE
While the Supreme Court has not promoted proper imple-
mentation of the Supremacy Clause in regard to U.S.-ratified
treaties, it has shown interest in the positions adopted in human
rights treaties as it construes rights protections in the U.S. Con-
stitution. To be sure, like the question of implementing the
Supremacy Clause, this matter has also been controversial for
the Court. In finding that the U.S. Constitution prohibits the
execution ofjuveniles, however, the Court recently referred to a
number of treaties that outlaw juvenile execution: the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the ICCPR, the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights, and the African Charter on
the Rights and Welfare of the Child. 92
Some state and federal judges have used ratified human
rights treaties as if they generate domestically applicable law, de-
spite the declarations against self-execution. One federal judge
191. See generally, Henkin, supra note 150.
192. See Roper v. Simmons, 544 U.S. _, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1199 (2005) (citing Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 43 (entered
into force Sept. 2, 1990); see also ICCPR, supra note 8; American Convention on Human
Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143 (entered into force July 18, 1978); African
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, adoptedJuly 11, 1990, OAU Doc. CAB/
LEG/TSG/Rev.1 (entered into force Nov. 28, 1999), available at http://www.africa-
union.org.
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used provisions of the ICCPR on family reunion, on prohibiting
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, and on the right of
aliens to present reasons against their expulsion in deciding
against the deportation of an alien. 9 '
In one Ohio case, a dissenting judge of the Ohio Supreme
Court was presented with the case of foreigner convicted of capi-
tal murder, but who was not informed at the time of arrest of his
rights under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention.'94 The judge
recited her personal history as the child of missionaries and her
residency abroad in that context.195 She noted the importance
of the role that U.S. officials may be able to play to protect U.S.
nationals arrested abroad.' 96 She wrote, in her dissent, that she
would reverse a capital murder conviction for the Article 36 vio-
lation:
Our best way to ensure that other nations honor the treaty by
providing consular access to our nationals is to demand strict
adherence to the right to consular access for foreigners in our
country .... If the United States fails in its responsibilities
under the convention, then other member countries may
choose to do unto us as we have done unto them.' 9 7
A. The Courts as Implementer of International Obligations
The rights norms contained in ratified treaties are, moreo-
ver, norms which the United States has pledged to follow. Non-
implementation by the U.S. courts puts the United States in vio-
lation of its obligation towards the other States that have ratified.
Treaties may contain provisions that require that the courts of a
ratifying state provide remedies to protect the defined rights.'
Courts, as agencies of government, act in ways that are rele-
vant to implementation by a state of its international obligations.
Action or non-action by courts can place the United States in
violation of obligations and even subject it to international sanc-
tions. In settlement of the 1979 hostage-taking episode in Iran,
193. See Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206, 231-32 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
194. See State v. Issa, 752 N.E.2d 904, 931 (Ohio 2001) (Lundberg Stratton, J.,
dissenting).
195. See id. at 935.
196. See id.
197. Id. (emphasis in original).
198. See ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; see also Vienna Convention,
supra note 5, art. 36, 2.
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the United States and Iran established a claims tribunal for mu-
tual financial claims.' 99 Under the terms of the agreement, if
the tribunal gives an award, the courts of either Iran or the
United States must enforce it. 200 In one case, an Iranian party
won a tribunal award against a U.S. corporation and then sued
in U.S. district court to enforce it.20 ' The district court declined
to enforce the award, whereupon the Iranian party appealed to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, but that court
also denied enforcement. 202 The Iranian party then brought a
claim before the tribunal against the United States, arguing that
the U.S. courts' failure to enforce the award constituted a viola-
tion by the United States of its obligation under the U.S.-Iranian
agreement. 203 Agreeing with the Iranian party, the tribunal
awarded it damages to be paid by the United States.
20 4
If a treaty requires a remedy and a court with appropriate
jurisdiction fails to provide it, the State may be in violation of its
international obligations. In international law, a State is respon-
sible for its obligations regardless of which particular branch of
government is charged with meeting those obligations.205 As
stated in the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Inter-
nationally Wrongful Acts, "[t] he conduct of any State organ shall
be considered an act of that State under international law,
whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any
other functions. '"206
B. The Constitutional Rank of a Treaty
One hurdle is that the courts frequently refer to treaties as
199. See Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic
of Algeria concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, art. 2, Jan. 19, 1981,
reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 230.
200. See Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Award No. 62-A21-FTF, 15 (May
4, 1987).
201. See Iran Aircraft Indus. v. AVCO, 980 F.2d 141, 142 (2d Cir. 1992).
202. See id. at 146.
203. See Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Award No. 586-A-27-FT (June 5,
1998).
204. See id.
205. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
art. 4, in Report of the International Law Commission of the General Assembly on its
Fifty-third Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 84, U.N. Doc. A/56/10
(2001).
206. Id.
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being on a par with statutes, rather than occupying a rank that
more properly accords with a treaty's position in the constitu-
tional order.2"7 Based on this equation, courts have, for exam-
ple, declined to afford post-conviction relief to a person con-
victed of a crime, on the rationale that post-conviction relief re-
quires an allegation of a constitutional violation. 0 '
This equation of treaty and statute finds support in the Su-
preme Court decision in Whitney v. Robertson, an opinion that is
widely cited for the proposition that a treaty has no greater con-
stitutional rank than a statute. 20 9 The Court's rationale was that
the Supremacy Clause refers to both statutes and treaties as the
law of the land, therefore, they must be equal in rank.210 "By the
Constitution," said the Court, "a treaty is placed on the same
footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation.
Both are declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of
the land, and no superior efficacy is given to either over the
other. "211
That logic falls apart, however, when one analyzes the text
of the Supremacy Clause, to which the Court is referring. The
Supremacy Clause states: "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and
all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land. 2 1 2
The Supremacy Clause thus refers not simply to statutes and
treaties as law of the land, but to the Constitution as well.21 3 By
the Court's logic, the Constitution, treaties, and statutes all enjoy
the same rank-an impossible result. Arguably, the Supremacy
Clause subordinates statutes to the Constitution by referring to
the laws of the United States as being made pursuant to the Con-
stitution. But it does not expressly subordinate treaties, since
one aim of the Clause was to make clear that the supreme law of
the land included not only treaties made after the date of the
Constitution, but also those made previously under the Articles
207. See, e.g., State v. Loza, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 4574 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
208. See id.
209. See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (citing Whitney v. Robert-
son, 124 U.S. 190 (1888)) (noting that as between a statute and a treaty, the one "last in
date" controls).
210. See Whitney, 124 U.S. 190.
211. Id. at 194.
212. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
213. See id.
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of Confederation.214 In that sense, not all treaties were "pursu-
ant" to the Constitution, though the Supreme Court decided
nonetheless that personal liberties protected by the Bill of Rights
could not be infringed by the conclusion of a treaty.215
In a later case, the Supreme Court, without indicating it was
backing off the position it took in Whitney v. Robertson, suggested
that treaties might be different from statutes, at least in regard to
the scope of what they might regulate. 21 6 There the issue was
whether the federal government could, by treaty, intrude on the
rights of the constituent states, even in a situation in which Con-
gress would not be entitled to do so. 2t 7 A treaty regulated the
killing of migratory birds passing through the United States.2 18
The Court had already held void an Act of Congress that pur-
ported to effect such regulation. 219 Then, by treaty, the federal
government provided for federal authority in the matter.220
Contrasting a treaty with an Act of Congress in this regard, the
Court explained "qualifications" on the federal treaty-making au-
thority as follows:
We do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to
the treaty-making power; but they must be ascertained in a
different way. It is obvious that there may be matters of the
sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act of
Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by
such an act could, and it is not lightly to be assumed that, in
matters requiring national action, "a power which must be-
long to and somewhere reside in every civilized government"
is not to be found.2 2 1
While the issue in that case was the scope of what might be
covered by a treaty as opposed to an Act of Congress, the Court
was nonetheless intimating that treaties might occupy a rank a
step above that of an Act of Congress.222 This hint has not, how-
214. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957).
215. See id. at 17 ("The prohibitions of the Constitution were designed to apply to
all branches of the National Government and they cannot be nullified by the Executive
or by the Executive and the Senate combined.").
216. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
217. See id. at 432.
218. See id. at 431.
219. See id. at 432.
220. See id. at 431.
221. Id. at 433.
222. See id. at 435.
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ever, been developed in subsequent cases.
In any event, treaties represent a commitment of the nation
to other nations of the world. To the extent they do not infringe
on individual rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, there is no
inherent reason they should rest only on a par with an Act of
Congress as far as the courts are concerned. Courts have, in fact,
shown some sympathy for according treaties a higher status in
cases in which statutes and treaties appear to conflict. Although
Whitney v. Robertson says that the two are on a par, and that the
later in time prevails, when a later statute appears to conflict
with a treaty, courts have gone to great lengths to construe the
statute in a way that does not conflict with the treaty. 22 3
C. Deference to the Executive as a Canon of Construction
It is ultimately to the courts to decide what role to accord
treaties, as they construe the Supremacy Clause. So, too, is it for
courts to construe treaties, just as they construe statutes and the
Constitution. Courts have deferred to the executive when treaty
provisions are ambiguous. 224 That practice is being questioned.
Perplexed over what he found to be an insupportable reading of
the Vienna Convention by the State Department, First Circuit
Judge Torruella pointed out that finding the meaning of a treaty
is a task that falls to the courts under the Supremacy Clause.2 2 5
"We are no longer merely considering international agreements
to be administered or enforced at the discretion of the State De-
partment, in which its interpretation as to applicability is entitled
to special expertise or deference," he wrote. 226 The Vienna Con-
vention, after being ratified, he said, "became the municipal law
of the United States pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, and its
provisions enforceable in the courts of the United States at the
behest of affected individuals without the need for additional
legislative action. 227
223. See, e.g., United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
224. See, e.g., Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961) ("While courts interpret
treaties for themselves, the meaning given them by the departments of government
particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is given great weight.").
225. See United States v. Nai Fook Li, 206 F.3d 56, 69 (2000) (Torruella, J., dissent-
ing).
226. Id. at 69-70.
227. Id.
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If the proposition that treaties are the law of the land is to
be taken seriously, it is the courts who bear the burden of con-
struing and applying them. If a treaty affects only private parties,
like the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods,2 28 the executive branch may be neutral on an issue
before the court. Where, however, the issue before the court is
whether the executive has violated the treaty, deference to the
executive may simply deny a plaintiff recovery.2 29
In Hamdan's suit challenging the action of the President
under the Third Geneva Convention, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit said it would defer to the President's con-
struction of the Convention. 230 The panel said that "his con-
struction and application of treaty provisions is entitled to 'great
weight.' 23 ' Deferring to the executive in that situation jeopar-
dizes due process. Courts are to be neutral arbiters, and if, upon
suit against the executive branch, the judicial branch-another
branch of the same government-accepts the executive's con-
struction over the plaintiff's, the court will not be seen to be do-
ing justice.
CONCLUSION
In a piece she prepared for a book on implementation of
treaties, former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
wrote: "I think domestic courts should faithfully recognize the
obligations imposed by international law. The Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution gives legal force to for-
eign treaties, and our status as a free nation demands faithful
compliance with the law of free nations."23 2 Contrary to Justice
O'Connor's plea, today's judges often seem at pains to find a way
around implementing the Supremacy Clause when a treaty-
based right is asserted before them.
Early in the history of the Republic, rights based on a treaty
228. See Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11,
1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3.
229. See, e.g., Hamdan II, 415 F.3d 33, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (deferring to the Presi-
dent's interpretation of the Third Geneva Convention).
230. See id. at 41-42.
231. Id. at 41 (stating that " [the President's] construction and application of treaty
provisions is entitled to 'great weight'").
232. Sandra Day O'Connor, Federalism of Free Nations, in INTERNATIONAL LAw DECI-
SIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS 13, 18 (Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H. Fox eds., 1996).
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commitment were respected by the courts. If the courts do not
implement treaty-based rights, we are open to the charge of "na-
tional perfidy" about which James Madison warned.2 3 We are
subscribing to principles in a commitment to other nations but
then failing to follow them. To comply with Justice O'Connor's
recommendation, judges need not find new legal principles.
They need only look at their own history.
233. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937):
Plainly, the external powers of the United States are to be exercised without
regard to state laws or policies. The supremacy of a treaty in this respect has
been recognized from the beginning. Mr. Madison, in the Virginia Conven-
tion, said that if a treaty does not supersede existing state laws, as far as they
contravene its operation, the treaty would be ineffective. 'To counteract it by
the supremacy of the state laws, would bring on the Union the just charge of
national perfidy, and involve us in war.'
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